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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
i»liOEBE H. DlTRRANT, 
Plai,ntiff and Respondent, 
-YS.-
X.:\~CY I)li~LTON, 




~T.:\TE~IENrr OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the 
plnintiff for damages occurring when a vehicle driven by 
the defendant collided with the plaintiff's vehicle which 
w·as stalled on \"\T asatch Boulevard in or partly within a 
traveled lane at about 3 :20 or 5 :30 p.m. on ~larch 11, 
1963. 
Dl~Pl)SlTIOX BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The l'a:'e "·as submitted to a jury which returned 
n Yerdict for plaintiff in the amount of $656.37. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks to vacate the judg-
ment entered in the plaintiff's favor and an order of this 
court that the case be remanded to the District Court for 
a new trial. 
STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts does not comply 
with the rule of this court that they should be set forth 
not merely as the appellant contends them to be but as 
they must be viewed on appeal; that is, favorable to the 
verdict of the jury, so the respondent will set forth her 
own statement of facts. 
On March 11, 1963, at about the hour of 5 :20 or 5 :30 
p.m. (R 95) the plaintiff was proceeding in a southerly 
direction along Wasatch Boulevard where it cuts through 
the gully at Parley's Canyon in the inside lane of the 
two southbound lanes of traffic. She had progressed be-
yond the low part of the gully and 'Yas on the upgrade 
when her motor sputtered. When her motor started to 
sputter she pulled it to the right and got as far to the 
right as she could before the motor died (R 98). The 
point 'Yhere the vehicle came to a stop was 3 to 4 blocks 
south of the junction of W asa.tch Boulevard "~ith Par-
ley's Way. (R. 99) There was a light snow falling at the 
time. (R 96) The plaintiff's lights were burning on her 
vehicle. (R 97) From the point 'vhere ~[rs. Durrant's 
car was stopped one could see all of the high,Yay back to 
Parley's Way including the dip (R 113). (See also Ex-
hibit 7) There was other traffic follo,ving plaintiff in the 
2 
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snme lnne of traffic she \Vas in and she obserYed a fp"· 
rnn~ trnvPling in thP ~arne direction as she turn out into 
thP inside lane \vhen thPy "·ere 3 to 6 car lengths from 
the plaintill"'s rar after she had come to a stop. (R 99) 
~Irs. l)urrnnt, the plaintiff, while sitting in her car, turned 
nrottnd in the sPat and looked back and observed the de-
t't,ndnut 's rar and a truck carrying the witnesses, Mr. and 
'Irs. Anderson, just coming down the hill past Parley's 
\Vny. (R 98-99) l\Irs. Pelton's car was in front and they 
wPrP thn'P to four blocks from plaintiff's car. After she ob-
~t~rvPd them shP turned back around and sat there waiting 
for them to go out around her before she decided what 
to do. ShP stated that the truck and car were traveling 
t'nirly fast. (R 113) Shortly thereafter the impact oc-
rurred. \\"hPn she observed the defendant's car and the 
follo"·ing t rurk slH' stated that they did not have their 
light~ on. 'Vhen her car sputtered, it sounded like it 
might ha ,.e been out of gas but she observed her gas 
g-nng-P and it read 1/s full. (R 100) When the impact oc-
rnrred, plaintiff's glasses "'"hich she "\Vas wearing at the 
time w·ere thro,vn into the back seat as 'vell as her gloves 
\Yhieh she had on her hands. (R 104) She sustained a 
"·hiplash injury (R 104), bruises to her chest, back, legs 
n nd n bdomen. She incurred medical bills in the amount of 
~t)~l.ll. Her injuries had healed completely by the time 
of trial. (R 111) 
In contrast to the foregoing facts the defendant tes-
tified th('t it had been sno,ving heavily for some time 
hefore the accident, bnt at the same intensity before 
!he aeeit1ent as of the time of the accident. (R 123-
3 
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126) She stated her vision was limited by the sno"?' but 
she could see 60 to 70 feet in front of her. (R 139) She had 
her lights on but the plaintiff and some other cars did not 
have their lights on. (R 136) She did not see the p1ain-
tiff's car until she was within 30 feet of it. (R 123) She 
was traveling at about 25 miles per hour (R 124) and she 
stated that under the conditions that existed at the time 
the accident oceurred she could not stop her car "·ithin 
the distance she could see in front of her. (R 139) As 
soon as she saw the car in front of her she immediately 
applied her brakes but slid into the car. (R 126-127) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO l\IAIN-
TAIN CONTROL OVER HER VEHICLE, TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT AND TO 
TRAVEL AT A REASONABLE SPEED. 
Appellant contends that the giving of plaintiff'~ re-
quested instructions No. 6, 7 and 8 was an adoption of 
the doctrine of Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy, 80 Utah 331, 
and that said rule announced in Dalley v. ]fidwestern 
Dairy is no longer the Utah law. The three instructions 
complained of by the defendant are instructions per-
taining to lookout, control and the duty of a drivrr of 
a. motor vehicle to drive at a reasonable speed under 
the existing conditions. In the Dalley v. lVlidu:estern 
Dairy case the court did announce and adopt the rule of 
law that it is negligence as a matter of law for a person 
4 
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to dri\·e nn automobile on a. traveled public highway used 
by vehieles and pedestrians at such a rate of speed that 
said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance at 
whieh the operator of said car is able to see objects upon 
the high\\·ny in front of him, citing the cases of Nikole-
ropoulos , .. Ran1sey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 304, and other 
ThP plaintiff in its requested instruction No.2 (R. 31) 
did, in faet, request the court to instruct the jury with re-
spPrt to the use of lights and that it was negligence as a 
mnttPr of la \V for a person to drive a. vehicle upon a high-
way nt a rate of speed that the vehicle could not be stop-
p(\d "·ithin the distance at v;hich the operator of the 
,·rhirle "·as able to see objects on the high,Yay in front of 
her and likewise, 'vith respect to driving at a. speed at 
which she 'vas not able to stop when she saw plaintiff's 
vehicle, but the court refused the instruction. 
On thr fa.cts as they existed in the case of Dalley Y • 
.llidw()sfern Dairy, our Supreme Court would apparently 
still come to the same conclusion. However, there are ex-
ceptions to the general rule in the Dalley v. Mid~v-estern 
Dairy case. Some of the exceptions to the general rule are 
expressed in cases such as Nielson r. Wata;nabe, 90 Utah 
401. 62 (P(2) 117, where the driver of a car 'vas suddenly 
and unexpectedly blinded by the lights of an approaching 
vehicle and "·hile so blinded the collision occurred. Un-
der these circumstances the Utah Supreme Court held 
that it ""as not contributory negligence as a matter of la":-
to run into an unlighted Yehicle but was a question of fact 
for the jury. In Trinl.ble Y. r"nion Pacific Etages, 105 
5 
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Utah 457, 142 P(2) 674, the Utah Supreme Court heltl 
that a bus driver was not negligent as a matter of law 
where the automobile in which the plaintiff decedent \ras 
riding \vas parked on the left shoulder of the higlnvay 
\vithout lights and was struck by the bus when it sud-
denly entered a fog area. In the case of Hodges Y. lV aite, 
270 P(2) 461, 2 Utah(2) 152, our court held that it \rns a 
jury question as to whether or not the plaintiff \J{as guilty 
of contributory negligence when he came around a cur\·e 
which blocked his view and ran into the trailer of the de-
fendant which \vas parked on the right shoulder of the 
road with part of the trailer being upon the hard surfaee. 
In the case of Federated Milk Producers Association v. 
Statewide Plumbing a,n.d Heating Company, 11 Utah (2) 
294, 358 P(2) 348, the headlights of an approaching car 
and a large trenching machine on one side of the road 
obscured and distracted the attention of the plaintiff and 
the court again ruled that the plaintiff \vas not negligent 
as a matter of law in failing to see an unlighted row of 
dirt in time to have stopped before striking it, and that 
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was 
a proper question for the jury. 
In the case before this court the trial judge did not 
make a ruling as a matter of law with respect to the neg-
ligence of the defendant but did properly submit it to the 
jury on proper instructions defining the defendant's duty 
\vith respect to lookout, speed and control. 
There is a dispute in the evidence with respect to the 
existing conditions at the time of the accident. However, 
by the defendant's O\vn testimony it appears that the 
6 
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sno\\·storm, \vhatever the severity of it may have been, 
wns of the snme relative intensity some time before the 
nc<·itlent as it \Vas at the time of the accident. The de-
t'endunt \ras, therefore, not surprised by the existence of 
thP ~torm or the nature of it and if she was, as indicated 
in her testimony, driving at a speed "~here she could not 
~top '"ithin the range of her headlights the least that 
<·ould he said would be that it would be a jury question as 
tCl whether or not she was driving at a speed that was rea.-
sonuhlP and proper under the existing conditions. Like-
wi~P, her statement that she could see 60 to 70 feet in 
front of her but that she didn't see the defendant's ve-
hicle until she was 30 feet from it would again raise the 
qnPstion as to whether or not she was keeping a proper 
lookout and this also would be a question for the jury. 
And again, if in fact the defendant was driving at a speed 
\vhere she could not stop within the distance at which 
~he could see objects in front of her, the issue of whether 
nr not she had proper control of her vehicle would be a 
proper one to submit to the jury. 
The "~itnesses, ~Ir. and Mrs. Anderson, were aware 
of the existence of the plaintiff's vehicle on the higlY\vay 
t'rom the time they started down the hill until the time of 
impact between the defendant's and plaintiff's vehicles. 
If they \Yere able to observe the plaintiff's vehicle under 
the same general circumstances that existed with respect 
to the defendant then it would be a question for the jury 
a~ to \vhether or not the defendant should also have seen 
the plaintiff's vehicle and been aware of it before the 
time she actually did observe it, according to her o"rn 
tt'~timony. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IK-
STRUCTION NO. 11. 
On pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief appellant states 
that, "It is the obligation of the trial court, \vhen re-
quested, to give an instruction which is oriented to the sit-
uation rather than to giYe a general instruction in terms 
'vhich have little meaning to the lay mind." Appellant 
has cited as error failure of the court to giYe its rr-
quested instruction No. 11 but an examination of the in-
struction indicates that the instruction is not oriented 
to the particular situation that existed at the time this 
accident occurred. For instance, there is no evidence 
\Vha tsoever in the case that there \Yas any sudden heavy 
smoke or any fog, any lightning, or a rainstorm, or that 
in fact the headlights of the defendant were fault~r. In-
cluding these items in an instruction pertaining to this 
case "rould be error. 
The defendant complains about the rourt 's giv-
ing the instruction it did on unavoidable accidents, but 
the defendant in its requested instruction No. 10 request-
ed the court to give the instruction on unavoidable acci-
dents as it "ras given by the court. Respondent, therefore, 
submits that the court properly refused to gi,~e the ap-
pellant's instruction No. 11 as requested. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID XOT ERR IX FAILING TO 
GIVE .L\PPEI.JI.i.ANT'S REQUESTED IK-
STRUCTION NO. 13. 
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~\ppcllant in her brief at page 14 has claimed that re-
~pondrnt alleged shP ran out of gas and that appellant 
ndmittPd it .. A review of the pleading 'viii show that ap-
pt-llant in her answer (R 3) denied that plaintiff ran out 
of gas and alleged that plaintiff in fact parked her ve-
h i<'le on the highway. The pre-trial order set up the issues 
to he trieu. One of defendant's contentions "~hich 'vas 
set up as an issue to be tried was that plaintiff 'vas neg-
ligl'nt ''in failing to have her car properly fueled so the 
snmP would not run out of gas at a. dangerous time and 
plare." (R 7) The burden of showing this was upon the 
dPfendant. Defendant also still contended that plaintiff 
parked her car and this was an issue. (R 7) 
.. \ t the time of trial plaintiff testified without o bjec-
tion upon the part of the defendant (R 100, 101) that she 
did not kno\v 'vhy her car sputtered and stopped; that in 
t'a~t her gas gauge did not read empty but Ys full a.nd 
that later she drove the car a short distance before put-
ting any gas in it. (R 116) Appellant's counsel on page 
13 of his brief claims that he objected to such testimony 
being given but the record is to the contrary. After all 
the t'\vidence \vas in and both parties had rested, the plain-
tiff moved the court for an order allowing plaintiff to 
nmend the complaint to conform to the evidence or proof 
thnt w·as offered. (R 74) This was the first time defend-
nut's counsel objected. The court granted the motion 
(R 73 ). Defendant had already filed his request for in-
~trurtions from 1 to 12 (R 38) which did not include any 
request pertaining to negligence " .. ith respect to running 
Put of ~a~ and it 'vas only after plaintiff's motion to 
9 
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amend had been granted that defendant then filed the 
requested instruction No. 13 asking the court to instrurt 
the jury that they must find that plaintiff's automobilP 
stalled upon the high\vay by reason of the exhaustion of 
its gas supply. The defendant never did request an in-
struction pertaining to whether or not one is JH•gli.~·( 1 llt 
if her car stalls by reason of the exhaustion of h<-~r ga~ 
supply. 
In appellant's brief, K cllar v. Brenc1uau ~ 133 \Vash. 
208, 279 P. 588, has been cited supporting the doctrine 
that a driver is guilty of negligence in operating his rar 
over a high·w·ay in a condition \Yhere it becomes stalled 
for \Yant of a sufficient gas supply, it is further stated 
that research has revealed no judicial statement of a 
contrary view. The respondent desires to cite a fe\Y rases 
to the contrary. 
In the case of Fick v. H ernzan Oil Trausport Com-
pany, Nebraska 11 CCH (2) 366, a 1955 case, a truck 
tank combination hauling gasoline ran out of gas. The 
driver had failed to check it before leaving on a trip 
assuming that the driver \vho had last driven the truck 
had in accordance "Tith usual practice had the gasoline 
tank filled. The road point \Y here the tank ran out of 
~ras had about a ten foot shoulder but it \Yas soft and ,..., 
muddy at the time and the driver of the truck, therefore, 
pulled over to the right as far as he could \Yithout going 
out on the shoulder. The plaintiff vehicle ran into the 
rear of the tanker. The plaintiff charged the drivrr of 
the tanker \Yith negligence in failing to check the fuel 
and for running out of gas on the high''Tay. This issue 
10 
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wns submitted to the jury. On appeal, the appellant cited 
ns Prror the fuilure of the trial court to withdraw this 
issu~. On appeal, the trial court held the mere stalling of 
n vehirle temporarily on the highway caused by the ex-
haustion of the gas supply would not ipso facto consti-
t uh• negligence as a matter of law and in this case there 
ht•ing no evidence to show that the driver 'vas negli-
gent the issue should have been withdrawn from the jury. 
In the case of Rath v. Bankston, a 1929 California 
('US(\, 281 P. 1081, the court held that the truck driver's 
failure to maintain sufficient fuel in the gasoline tank was 
excusable 'vhere the same procedure as to refilling the 
tank had been sufficient on previous trips. 
In Volume 2, Section 824, Blashfield, Permanent Edi-
tion, at page 3, it is stated: 
•' Generally speaking it is the duty of a driver on 
a. highway to see that the car is maintained in such 
condition as to the fuel supply that it may not be-
come a menace on the highway to other traffic by 
stopping on the road, and failure to exercise rea-
sonable care to keep it in proper condition in this 
respect is negligence. But if a motorist has exer-
cised reasonable care, an unforeseen failure of his 
gasoline supply does not constitute negligence.'' 
The respondent, therefore, submits that the court 
was not in error in failing to allow plaintiff to amend her 
complaint. It 'vas only amended to conform to the proof 
and the issues already set up and consequently the court 
like,vise did not err in refusing to give appellant's re-
qnPsted instruction X o. 13. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
The court's instructions were fair and proper and n 
fair trial was had by both parties. The trial court's judg-
ment on the jury verdict should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI and 
LAWRENCE L. SUl\IMERHAYS 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
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